PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT.
The extent to which a personal responsibility will be imposed upon directors is a matter of vital importance to the
prospective director, the courts, and the investing public. The
prospective director is eager to ascertain the possible liabilities
to which he may be subjected; the courts seek to administer a
standard of responsibility calculated to harmonize the individual
interests of the directors with the public trust which they have
assumed; while the investing public, the prospective stockholder,
should be assured that those on whose names he relies for the
security of his investment will, in fact, supervise the internal
management of the corporation.
The conception that directors are mcreI "gratuitous mandatories"' is gradually being supplanted by the view that the

office of director involves a fiduciary relation, for a breach of
which liability should be imposed in accordance with the principles underlying the relation of trustee and cestd que trust.2
The present problem is to determine when the jurisdiction of
equity over trusts shall be invoked for a breach of this fiduciary
8
duty.
That directors are liable for fraud or gross dereliction of
duty is an obvious consequence of the quasi trusteeship assumed. 4 It is, however, in those "twilight zone" cases, where
directors, being guilty of no fraud or gross negligence, have
wrecked the corporation through their honest but reckless and,
1

Trimble v. American Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 340 (19O).

SMorawetz, I Private Corporations, Sec. 516 et seq.; Briggs v. Spaulding,
141 U. S. 132 (1890).
'Beers v. Bridgeport Bridge Co.. 42 Conn. 17 (1875), declaration of
dividends; Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616 (1874); Wright v. Oroville
Mining Co, 40 Cal. 2o (87o); Hobbs v. Tom Reed Mining Co., 164 Cal.
407 (19T3): Heinemann v. Marshall. 1x7 Mo. Ap. 546 (i9o5), secret profits;
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parrish, 42 Md. 598 (1875); Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362 (1O3) ; Fisher v. Parr. 92 Md. 245 (igox), standard of
care required: Austin City R. R. Co. v. Swigker, I W. & W. Civil Cases (t.
Ap. See. 76) i88o.
'Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (i8go); Miese v. Lorens, _ Ohio N. P. 307
(1898) ; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196 (1889) ; Killen v. State
Bank, xo6 Wis. 546 (xgoo).
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from a business standpoint, absurd mistakes of judgment that
courts have divided. The assumption of the duties of a trustee
would clearly seem to include a guarantee of the exercise of
reasonable business judgment; the conception of directors as
trustees would involve liability for a failure to use such judgment irrespective of the"whiteness of the director's soul." On
the other hand, the view that no liability should arise in such
cases is the logical outgrowth of the conception of directors as
mercly gratuitous mandatories. It is my purpose in the brief
scope of this article, to show that the trend of modern law.
through the application of an expanded conception of the trusteeship of directors, is complying with the demands of modern
business by insisting on the exercise of reasonable care, skill and
business judgment in the management of corporate enterprises
and will no longer relieve directors who plead honesty but hopeless incapacity.
The leading case in America on the liability of directors
for mismanagement is Spering's Appeal,5 in which the opinion
is by Justice Sharswood. In that case the financial depression
after the Civil War, caused the failure of the National Safety
Insurance Trust Company, a Philadelphia bank. The directors,
in their effort to save the institution consumed the funds of
the company in reckless and improvident investments; loans
were made at usurious rates of interest in anticipation of large
profits; collateral was sacrificed in a vain attempt to sustain
credit; and, in the failure of the directors to assign at a time
when a great part of the assets could have been saved, there
was a lack of that reasonable business judgment on the part of
the directors on which stockholders rely. An action was brought
against the directors to recover damages resulting from the
improvident investments sanctioned by the board. The court
denied relief holding that directors are merely gratuitous mandatories and are to be held responsible to the corporation only
where their breach of trust is of such a character as to warrant
the imputation of fraud or gross negligence amounting to
'71 Pa. ix (W872).
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fraud. 6 The court, sl~eaking through Mr. Justice Sharswood,
concluded that
"While directors are personally responsible to the stockholders
for any losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or wilful misconduct or breach of trust for their own benefit and not for the benefit
of the stockholders, for gross inattention and negligence by which
such fraud and misconduct has been perpetrated by agents, officers
or co-directors, yet they are not liable for mistakes of judgment,
even though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and
ridiculous, provided they are honest and provided they are fairly
within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body."
In the course of the opinion the famous English case of
Turquardv. Marshall7 is cited with approval. In that case Lord
Hatherly, speaking of a loan by the directors of a-corporation
without security, says:
"It was within the power of the deed to lend to a brother director, and, however foolish the loan might have been, so long as-it
was within the power of the directors, the court could not interfere
and make them liable. They were entrusted with full powers of
lending the money. It was part of the business of the concern
to trust people with money, and their trusting to an undue extent
is not a matter with which they could be fixed, unless there Was
something more than that alleged, namely, that it was done fraudulently and improperly and not merely by a default of judgment.
Whatever may have been the amount lent to anybody, however
ridiculous and absurd it would seem, it is a misfortune for the company that they chose such unwise directors; but as long as they kept
within the powers of the deed, I could not interfere with the discretion exercised by them."
Thus, in Pennsylvania, under the holding in Spering's
Appeal, so long as the directors act in good faith, and within
the scope of their authority, they cannot be held responsible to
the corporation 'for honest mistakes of judgment no matter how
reckless and absurd, when measured by the standard of reasonable prudence and ordinary business judgment.
The case of _hot v. Cary s stands in dramatic contradiction
to the rule laid down by Justice Sharswood in Siering'sAppeal.
' Spering's Appeal ubi supra, at p. 24.
'38 L J., Ch. 639 (1869).
882 N. Y. 6s (88o).
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The facts in Hun v. Cary in their essential particulars are on
all fours with Spering's Appeal, the Court of Appeals in New
York, however, arriving at an opposite conclusion. In this case
the trustees of an insolvent savings bank voted the purchase
of an expensive lot in New York City as a site for a new bank
building, hoping thereby to induce confidence in the financial
standing of the institution and increase its deposits. The insolvent condition of the bank was known to the trustees at the
time of the purchase, but there was no suggestion of bad faith
on the part of the trustees, their purpose in making the purchase
being the mistaken belief as to what constituted the best interests of the corporation. The charter empowered the corporation to purchase a lot requisite for the transaction of the banking business. The purchase was intravires. The court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Earl, held that the facts justified a finding
that the case was not one of mere error or mistake of judgment
on the part of the trustees, but of improvident and reckless
extravagance and that the trustees should be held liable for the
loss occasioned by such action on their part. Spering's Appeal
was duly considered by Justice Earl when deciding Hun v. Cary,.
but its soundness squarely denied. In referring to that case he
says:
"In Spering's Appeal, Justice Sharswood said that directors
'are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be
so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they
were honest, and provided they are fairly within the scope of the
powers and discretion confided to the managing body.' As I under-"
stand this language I cannot assent to it as properly defining to any
extent the nature of a director's responsibility. Like a mandat6ry,
to whom he has been likened, he is bound not only to exercise proper
care and diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment. As he is bound
to exercise ordinary skill and judgment he cannot set up that he
does not possess them."
The salient facts in Hun v. Cary are on "all fours" with
those of Spering's Appeal, supra. In both cases the improvident investment was made in the interest of the corporation; in
both cases there was no suggestion of fraud; in both cases the
act of the directors was within the powers conferred by the
charter; but in Hun v. Cary the court held that honest but"

132

UNIVERSITY' OF PENNSYLVANI4

DlIV REI'IEW

reckless improvidence in an intra vires transaction is the foundation of liability, whereas in Spering's Appeal, it was held
that no liability existed in the absence of gross negligence
amounting to fraud the court refusing to hold that there
could be such gross error of judgment in an intra vires transaction as to constitute a liability on the part of the directors
who were guilty of it. Thus, in New York, it is held that directors must exercise reasonable prudence and ordinary business
judgment, and that reckless mistakes of judgment, although in
good faith and within the scope of their powers, will constitute
the basis of liability.
The rule of Spering's Appeal, is an evolution of the conception that directors are mere "gratuitous mandatories," serving without compensation. It is natural that a court, saturated
with this doctrine would look with favor upon a rule calculated
to relieve these mandatories except where guilty of flagrant
misconduct. The latter part of the nineteenth century, however, witnessed a change in the status of directors. Directorates were coveted positions, the number of boards on which an
individual served being an actual business asset. Compensation
in many cases was pecuniary, -but "indirect benefits" were always
an ample consideration. The personnel of directorates is often
the greatest inducement to a prospective stockholder. The
investing public is lulled into security by the names associated
with the undertaking and justice dictates that directors should
not, in the event of a crash due in part to their negligence,
shield themselves behind the cloak of a gratuitous mandatory
who has benefited by his position, but is unwilling to shoulder
its burdens. It is the merest sophism to speak of a modem
director as a grauitous mandatory.
The growth of "close corporations," or incorporated partnerships, as a method of conducting business further rebuts
the conception of directors as gratuitous mandatories. There
is an element of reason underlying the theory that a director
in a gigantic corporation is merely a mandatory, but it is folly
tc extend this doctrine to a corporation where the directors are,
in fact, the managing partners receiving lucrative salaries. To
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say that such directors are liable only for gross negligence when
acting intra vires, would be the vindication of a theory at the
expense of substantive justice.
The principle that courts will not interfere with the internal
management of corporations, or interpose any impediment to
the honest exercise of the discretion entrusted to directors, has
undoubtedly played an active part in establishing the lenient rule
of Spering's Appeal that directors are liable only for gross
negligence, and not for intra vires mistakes of judgment.9
The rule which forbids an interference by the courts with
the internal management of corporations, is founded in policy
and upon the knowledge that neither the machinery of the law,
nor the capacity of judges, is such as to control directors in the
honest exercise of their discretion. A statementof this ule,
however, does not involve the pronouncement of a doctrine such
as laid down in Spering's Appeal that, for negligence in the
internal management of the corporation, there is no liability unless so gross as to approximate fraud. It is one thing for courts
to say "we will not interfere with the honest exercise of directorate discretion"; it is quite a different proposition to announce
the doctrine that directors are not held to the standard of
ordinary care in an intra vircs transaction and are liable only
for gross negligence. The majority of Anierican jurisdictions
have adopted this distinction and although holding that no interference by the courts with the honest exercise of directorate
discretion will be permitted, have, nevertheless, laid down the
rule that whether the act of directors be intra vires or ultra
'Morawetz, Private Corporation, Sec. 243: "So long as the agents of
a corporation act honestly within the powers conferred upon them by the
charter, they cannot be controlled:' Thus, it has been held that, in the absence of fraud, such as an endeavor to "freeze out" a minority stockholder,
courts will under no circumstances interfere with the judgment of directors
in refusing to declare a dividend. INcXab v. Mfg. Co., 69 S. C. i8 (N. Y.
x8g); American Steel Foundries v. Lazear, 204 Fed. 204 (i913); Knapp v. S.
Jarvis Adams Co., 135 Fed. icoS (i9o5), where it is said that "directors of a

corporation are impliedly vested with a discretionary power with regard to
the time and manner of distributing its profits, and, in the absence of fraud
or an abuse of discretion, their action in leaving profits earmed in the business
instead of distributing them to the stockholders in dividends is leg'l, and constitutes no violation of the rights of a stockholder." See also Morawetz on
Corp., 447; Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (1889).
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vires they are held to the standard of ordinary care, skill, and
business judgment in the management of the affairs of the corporation.10 These cases clearly demonstrate that there is
nothing inconsistent in holding directors liable for a failure to
exercise reasonable judgment and at the same time refusing to
interfere with the internal management of the corporation. 1
The reasons assigned for the ru!e of Spering's Appeal, viz:
the conception of directors as gratuitous mandatories, and the
desire of courts not to interfere with the internal management
of corporations, do not, it is submitted, appeal to the intellect
as arguments for a standard that relieves directors from the
consequenc!es of absurd errors of judgment and holds them
liable only where gross negligence or fraud is disclosed.
The ruleitself cannot command respect. Gross negligence
is the want of slight care and diligence, 12 or the "gross failure
to exercise proper care,"' 3 and, in some cases, it has been held
to involve a degree of wilfulness or intent."
The mere statement of what gross negligence means condemns it as a rule to govern the conduct of directors who hold
themselves out to the public as capable business men. It -is
grotesque to say that a director in an intra vires transaction
affecting the interests of the stockholders can be as foolish as
lie desires provided his conduct is not a "gross failure to
exercise the proper care," that "crassa ncglcgentid" of the civil
law; nor would it act as a stimulus to the prospective investor
to learn that such a standard of care is all that is required of
"Mutual Redemption Bank v. Hill, 56 Me. 385 (1868); Hun v. Cary, 82
N. Y. 65 (i88o); Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52 (1882); Delano v.
247 (1887); Marshall v. Farmers Bank, 85 Va. 676 (1889);
Case, 121 Ill.
Langunas Nitrate Co. v. Langunas Syndictae (1899), 2 Chancery 392; Killon
v.Baines, xo6 Wis. 546 (igoo); Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N. Y. iO7 (1904).
11A comparison of Hun v.Cary, 82 IT.Y. 65 (iqo),.and McNab v.Mfg.
Co., 69 S. C. iS (N. Y. i89i), both decided in the same jurisdiction, illus-

trates the above distinction. The former case holds contra to Spering's
Appeal, while in the latter the court refuses to interfere with the exercise of
the discretion entrusted to directors.
'Makin v. Paucah R. R. Co., io Ky. 68o (1goi).
Dolphin v.-Vorcester Consol. Ry., iog Mass. 28o (i9o5).
"Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis..97 (904).
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those who are represented to the public as directors of the corporation.1 5
Pennsylvania judges have perceived that this rule is opposed to business demands and instead of applying one standard,
that of due care to all directorate action, have whittled away
the effect of Spering's Appeal by refusing to apply its rule to
10
vltra vires transactions.
The cases in Pennsylvania seem to demonstrate
a desire
to avoid the consequences of Spering's Appeal. In practically
all the cases involving the liability of directors in Pennsylvania,
for negligence, decided since 1872, the facts were either such
as to excuse the directors on the ground that no absence of due
care was shown, or the act was ultra vires and the directors
held liable on the theory of a breach of trust.
In the case of Siventzel. v. Penn Bank,' 7 it Was sought to
hold the directors for the losses occasioned by g.igantic oil speculations indulged in by the president with the funds of the bank,
although the evidence showed that the fraud could not have
been discovered with the use of due care or by the ordinary
examination of the books which directors in similar institutions
customarily made. The court squarely vindicated the rule of
Spcring's Appeal holding that: "Bank directors being gratuitous mandatories, are only liable for fraud or such gross negligence as amounts to fraud." It is, however, mere dicta for a
court to announce the doctrine that directors are only liable
for gross negligence, where the facts are such as to show that
the directors were in the exercise of due care and hence 'would
have escaped liability in any jurisdiction. In Commonwealth
v. Building & Loan Assn.,' 8 there was an attempt to hold the
directors responsible for losses occasioned by the declaration -of
"5In accord with Spering's Appeal, supra: Godbold v. Mobile Bank, ji
Ala. x9I (1847); Witters v. Sowles, 31 Fed. i (1887); Briggs v. Spaulding,
X4I U. S. 132 (i89i); Gibbins v. Bank of Commerce, 79 I1. App. i5o (i898).
The language of these cases does not go to the extent of that in Spering's
Appeal as to honest but absurd mistakes of judgment.
'Loan Society v. Eavanson, 248 Pa. 407 (x915).
t 147 Pa. 140 (i892).

"2o Pa. Super. Ct. Iot (9oz).
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a dividend when the association was insolvent. The directors
had acted on the faith of the report of the financial committee
and advice of counsel. The court held that the directors were
not liable on the ground that no case of negligence or want of
due care was presented. The court adherred to the language
of Spering's Appeal, but it is submitted the case was not one
where the rule could have been involved since even ordinary
negligence was not shown, to say nothing of gross negligence
within the meaning of the rule.
The case of Cornell v. Seddinger 19 indicates the recent tendency of Pennsylvania courts to ignore the rule of SpcAfng's
Appeal. In this case, the defendants, directors of a shipbuilding
company, were compelled to repay to the corporation certain
sums paid out of capital as dividends. Reports of the treasurer had been made to the board. Upon these reports the dividends had been declared. On behalf of the directors it was contended that, when they acted in good faith in declaring a dividend out of capital, they were not to be held liable if it develops
that the assets were incorrectly stated by the treasurer, or if
the assets afterward proved to be worthless. The court was
reminded that if a stricter test than that of good faith were imposed, no business man could be induced to act upon any board
---exactly the contention which was successfully made by counsel in Spering's Appeal. The attention of the court was called
to Spering's Appeal, supra, Watt's Appeal,20 Swentzel v. Penn
Bcink, supra, and other cases sustaining the gratuitous mandatory
and gross negligence theory. The directors, however, were
held liable, Mr. Justice Potter speaking for the court, holding:
"Directors are trustees or quasi trustees of the capital of the
company, and liable as trustees for any breach of duty with respect
to the application of it. . . . The directors of the shipbuilding
company were undoubtedly guilty of a dereliction of duty in that
they did not exercise ordinary care as directors."
In this case the standard of due care is announced as the
measure of directors' liability. The basis of the opinion is that
"237

Pa. 389

(1gT).

"78 Pa. 370 (1875).
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the directors declaring dividends out of capital had not exercised
ordinary care. It was not deemed necessary fo find them guilty
of gross negligence or fraud as in Spering's Appeal. True, the
act in the Seddinger Case was ultra vires; while that in Spering's
Appeal was within the powers conferred on the directors by the
charter, viz.: investment of the funds of the corporation. It
is noteworthy, however, that the court itself makes no such distinction, indicating that in all cases directors, like trustees,. must
exercise reasonable skill and- care in the administration of their
quasi trust.
The case of the Loan Society of Philadelphiav. Evanson 21
is the last authoritative statement of the law of Pennsylvania as
to the liability of directors. A bill in equity for an accounting
alleging negligence and mismanagement was brought by the
corporation against its directors. The capital had been impaired
by the declaration of unearned dividends; there was .afailure
to properly appraise and check the collateral on deposit, and, as
a result of lack of ordinary care, there was an over-issue of stock,
and fraudulent transactions with one of the customers were permitted. An accounting was decreed on the ground that the
directors were liable for a failure to exercise ordinary care.
Mr. Justice Mestrezat announcing the decision said:
"The rule generally applied is reasonable and ordinary care,
skill and diligence in conducting the business of the corporation
. . . This is the standard adopted in this State and the failure
to observe it imposes liability on a defaulting director."
The court considers Spering's Appeal, but quotes, not its
decision, but the.dicta of Justice Sharswood where -he says:
"I have found no judgment or decree which has held directors
to account, except when they have themselves been personally guilty
of some fraud on the corporation, or have known and Connived at
some fraud in others, or where such fraud might have been prevented had they given ordinary attention to their duties. I do not
mean to say . . . that there might not exist such a case of negli-

gence or of acts clearly ultra vires as would make perfectly honest
directors personally liable."
"248 Pa. 407 (191s).
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It is to be observed that the court in this recent case does
not subscribe to the actual holding in Spering's Appeal, nor does
it quote the passage where Justice Sharswood says that no matter how reckless or absurd the conduct of directors might appear they cannot be held liable for mistakes of judgment in anintra vires transaction. Mr. Justice Mestrezat does not qualify
the rule of ordinary care so as to apply it only to ultra vires transactions; he lays it down as the standard of all directorate action.
Gross negligence was undoubtedly present in the Evanson
Case, and it would have been decided the same way in 1872.*
The value of the case is in the rule announced, which, in its
generality, is identical with the New York rule of Hun v. Cary
-the court even citing with approval the New York case of
Childs v. l1hite,22 where it is said:
"Directors are bound to use a reasonable degree of care in the,
performance of those acts which, under the circumstances, prudence
would fairly seem to require them to perform." 23
The foregoing analysis of the decisions in Pennsylvania.
impels the conclusions that a change has occurred in the standard'
of care by which the liability of directors is to be judged. The
temper of the court has been altered. It would seem that the
fraud or gross negligence theory of Spering's Appeal has been
supplanted by the rule of due care for all directorate action announced in the Evanson case in 1915. The Evanson case lays
down the rule of due care as unequivocally as the case of Hunv.
Cary, and the writer feels no hesitancy in venturing the opinion
that should the facts of Spering's Appeal be presented to the
present Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the decision would be in
24
accord with the Evanson case and Hun v. Cary.
i 42N.Y. Supp. 732 (1%3).

court also cites: Mutual Building Fund Bank v. Bosseuix, 3 Fed.
817 (188o); Devlin v. Moore, 23o Pac. R. 35 (Ore. 1913). These cases do not
relieve the directors where there has been a reckless mistake in judgment. See
also: Morse on "Banking." p. 117; took "Corporations," 7th Ed, Sec. 682;
London Trust Co. v. MacKenzie. 68 L. T.*R. 38o (1893).
' Standard of due care applied in following cases whether transaction is
intra vires or ultra vires. Tooker v. Nat. Sugar Ref. Co.. So N. J. Eq. 305
(1912); Moses v. Ocoee Bank, x Lea 398 (Tenn. 1878); Williams v. McKay,
'The
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The present higher standard of directorate liability indicated by the foregoing citations, is, it is submitted, to be attributed to the, growing conception that' directors occupy a fiduciary position with reference to the corporation,2 5 and that
their liability is to be judged by standards applicable to express
trusteeship. One of the earliest pronouncements of the fiduciary
capacity of directors was made in Hopkins & Johnson'sAppeal,2 6
where it was held that directors could not use -their knowledge
as to the solvency of the corporation to obtain a preference over
other creditors, even though their debts were valid.2 7
Such emphatic declaration of -the trust relation of director
was hardly consistent with a doctrine such as announced in
Spcring's Appeal permitting even reckless and absurd mistakes
of judgment if made in good faith. The conception of directors
as fiduciaries appears so equitable, and the doctrine of Spcring"s
Appeal so unjust to the stockholders, that the result has been- an"
expansion of the trusteeship theory and the necessary modification of the doctrine that gross negligence is the only basis of
directorate liability.
The trust relation of directors'is emphasized'in other phases
of the law defining the duties of directors. The law with reference to the right of a director to enter into a contract with
his corporation illustrates the jealousy with which the corporation is guarded from manipulation by its directors. -The rule
precluding a director from obtaining any advantage or secret
4o N. J. Eq. 189 (7885): Williams v. McDonald, 42 N. J. Eq. 392 (1886),
legality of instruments: Metropolitan Ry. v. Kneeland, z2o N. Y. 134 (18go),

care in the issue of void notes: Pierson v. Cronk, 26 Abb. N. Cas. 2.5 (N. Y.),

i891). Advice of counsel does not exonerate directors: Hodge v. N. E. Screw
J. E. 289 (1912) ; General
Rubber Co. v. Benedict. 215 N. Y. 18 (19I5). Standard that 'of ordinary
Co., i R. L 312 (185o) ; French v. Armstrong, 79 N.
director: Allen v. Roydhouse, 232 Fed.

1OO 0x916).

-

I People v. Turnbull, 93 Cal. 63o 0892); Power Co. v. Bank, 224 Fed.
39, 45 (1915).

"go Pa. 69 (8n).

'Kerstetter's Appeal, T49 Pa. x48 (1892); Mueller v. Fire Clay Co., 183
Pa. 450 (1898), containing good statement of duties arising out of trusteeship: Moller v. Fibre Co.. 187 Pa. s53 (898); Hill v. Telephone Mfg. Co.,
r98 Pa. 446 (igoz): Morawetz on Corporations, Sec. 787. This principle
does not prevent a director from enforcing his security or issuing execution
where his preference was not the result of an advantage due to his position
and the transaction was fair. Off v. Jack, 2o4 IlL 79 (i9o3); IIL Steel Co.
v. O'Donell, 156 11L 6z4 (z895).
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profit as a result of his position is fundamental. 28 -Where, however, a director with full disclosure of facts, bona fidc contrads
with his corporation, it is not so apparent'that the mere fact of
his relation to the corporation should avoid the contract, although such transactions should be subject to careful scrutiny
20
by the courts.
There is a total absence of harmony in the law in relation
to the validity of contracts between directors and their corporations, the state of the authorities on this question being represented by three views, which, for purposes of discrimination,
may be referred to as the Massachusetts, Nev Jersey and L ,glish views. In Massachusetts it has been held that where a
disinterested quorum authorizes the contract, and the terms
are provident and fair, the contract cannot be avoided. 30
Under the New Jersey rule it is held that the mere fact of
the contract's being made between director and his corporation
renders the contract voidable at the election of the corporation,
the cestui que trust.83
In Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 2 it was held that
"Such a. contract is not void, but voidable, to be avbided at the
option of the cestui que trust exercised within a reasonable time.
It matters not that the contract is a fair one." 33 This rule in
fact differs little from the Massachusetts rule, for,. if the con'Wardell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 103 U. S. 651 (88o), new company
composed of railroad directors to be recipient of advantageous contracts
from roads; Bank v. Downey, 53 Cal 466 0879); Jones v. Byrne, 149 Fed.
457 (.zgo6); Commonwealth T., I. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa; 410 (i.0);
Symmes v. Union Transit Co., 6o Fed. 83o, 864 (1894); Ward v. Davidson,
89 Mo. 445 (1886); Blair Town Lot Co. v. Walker, 5o Iowa -376 (879);
i Perry "Trusts." 3d Ed.. Sec. 429: Hayes v. Pierson. 61 N. J. E. 353 (18bo);
Howland v. Corn, 232 Fed. 35 (x916).
'Union Pac. R. R. v. Credit Mobilier, 135 Mass. 367 (1883).
"Fort Payne Co. v. Hill, 174 Mass,- 224 (1899); Hammond's Appeal,
123 Pa. 503 (i888); Nye v. Storer, 168 Mass. 53 (897); Leavenworth Co. v.
(hicago, etc., R. R. Co., 134 U. S.688 (1889) ;Barr v. N. Y., etc., Co., 125
N. Y. 263 (i8gi); Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn; 47 (1879); German-American
Seminary v. Keifer, 43 Mich. 105 (i88o); Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 3o1
(i895) ; Fillerbrown v. Hayward, 19o Mass. 472 (i9o6); Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589 (i9oS).
, Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. 48 (1883).

"38 N. J. Law SoS (1875).

-

"Gardner v. Butler, 30 N. J. Eq. 702 (r879); Twin Lick Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U. S.587 (1875); Marcy v. Guanajuato Co., 22s Fed. z5o ('915).
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tract is fair, it will not be avoided by the corporation although
the bare right to do so may exist.
The third and most stringent view is the English rule which
holds that the mere fact of his relation incapacitates a director
from entering into a contract with his corporation; in short,
his fiduciary relation is so emphasized that he is forbidden to
enter into any transaction, regardless of its intrinsic fairness,
which may render his personal interests antagonistic to the
3
corporation. 4
In the nature of things there is nothing which should'prevent a director's entering into a fair contract with his corporation; to forbid such contracts closes a vast market to the corporation, and may deprive it of advantages which it would otherwise possess. But so engrafted in the English law is the conception of the trusteeship of directors, that Lord Hardwicke eliminates the possibility of a. director's using his position for his
personal benefit, even where his action will be subject to inquiry
by the courts. In Whelpdale v. Cookson 35 he says, "It is not
enough for the trustee to say 'you cannot prove any fraud,', as
30
it is in his power to conceal it." Also in Dunconzbc v. R. R.,
it is said, "The rule is founded on the known weakness of
human nature and the peril of permitting any sort of collision
between the interests of the individual and his duty as trustee,
in his fiduciary character."
The most striking statement of this view is made by Chancellor Kent in the case of Davoue v. Fanning 37 where he-says:
"Nothing less than incapacity is able to shut the door against
temptation where the danger is imminent and the security against
discovery great. The wise policy of the law has therefore put the
sting of disability into the temptation as a defensive weapon against
the strength of the danger which lies in the situation."
On one proposition there is complete harmony in all jurisdictions: the contract must be authorized by a quorum of. dis"Aberdeen Co. v. Blakie, r Macq. 461 (H. L. 1854) ; Pork v. Russell, 36
Ind. 6o (1871): Haywood v. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639 (1885); Davoue v.
Fanning, 2 Johns Ch. 2j,2 (1816); Pike Comp. v. Hammons et al., x29
Ind. 368 (i8gi) ; Estate of Smythe v. Evans, 209 111. 376 (1904).
=i Ves. Sr. 9 (Eng. 1747).
13
5 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cases, p. 84.
"2 Johns Ch. 252, at p. 27o.
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interested directors, 38 and even in jurisdictions where the contract is voidable, it may be ratified by the unanimous consent
of the stockholders. 3 9
These conflicting views regarding the validity of contracts
between directors and their corporations are not referred to for
the purpose of raising a controversy as to the merits of any one
of them. The purpose is to indicate that, whether courts insist
that such contracts are void or voidable, or valid, depending
upon their terms, they all unite in affirming the proposition that
there is a quasi trust relation between the director and the corporation, which relation the courts must conserve.
The trusteeship of directors is emphasized not only where
the transaction is with the corporation, the cestui que trust, but
there is also considerable authority extending the fiduciary duty
of directors to their dealings with the individual shareholders,
the conception being that the direct duties owed to the corporation radiate to the individual stockholders. Thus, the Supreme
Court of the United States has subscribed to the view that, under
certain circumstances, a director is under a duty to disclose to the
shareholder the knowledge which he possesses as to the value
of the shares. 40 The weight of American authority, how.ever,
subscribes to the barbaric view that a director is under no fiduciary duty to the stockholder with reference to the purchase or sale
of stock, and so long as he is guilty of no active misrepresentation, the law permits him to avail himself of the knowledge
which he possesses as a director as to the actual value of the
shares. 41
Coleman v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 201 (z867).
1U. S. Steel v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 8o7 (19o2); Mobile Co. v. Gass,
142 Ala. 52o (io4).
IStrong v. Repide, 213 TJ. S. 419 (igog); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan.
a

498 (194).
'Walsh v. Goulden, 730 Mich. 53i (19o2); Bloom
I14 (1897); O'Neill v. Ternes, 32 Wash. 528 (19o3);
N. J. L 656 (891); Hooker v. Mill & Steel Co., 215
stick v. Fox, 9 Utah ITO (1893); Commissioners v.

(1873); Krumbhaar v. Griffiths, 15i

v. Loan Co., 152 N. Y.

Crowell v. Jackson, 53
IIl. 444 (I9o5); Haar-Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509

Pa. 223 (i89); i L. R. A. (N. S.)

258; Cook: Stock and Stockholders, Secs. 32o-351. But otherwise as to sale
of control: Porter v. Healey. 24, Pa. 427 (1914); Pa. Sugar Co. v. Am.
Sugar Ref. Co., 166 Fed. 254 (I908).

PERSOVAL LIABILITY

OF DIRECTORS

The same tendency to hold those in control of corporate enterprises to the exercise of the utmost diligence and good faith
in the interests of those subject to their control, finds expression
in the law regarding the duties of the majority stockholders to
the minority. Just as the powers reposed in directors are regarded as in the nature of a trust in favor of the corporation, 42
so the powers conferred upon the majority stockholders are regarded as a trust in favor of the minority.4 So emphatic have
been the expressions of this trust relation between the majority
and minority that a majority interest is more of a liability than
an asset. "Dummy directorates," acting as the tools of the majority,44 disposal of the corporate property for the benefit of
the majority at the expense of the minority, 4"
fraud in the

control of the corporate assets,40 and numerous other schemes.
have been upset at the suit of wronged minority shareholders.
The case of Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. v. ,V.Y. ctc. R. R. Co, 4 7
where the New York Central Railroad bought up a majority interest in the Northern Railroad, a competing line, and thereupon operated the road in the interest of the New York Central and to the detriment of the Northern, compelling foreclosure
on the Northern mortgages, contains an able statement of the
fiduciary duties of the majority. It is there said:
Thus, whether the courts are passing on the validity of-a
contract between a director and his corporation, or between a
director and an individual stockholder, or whether defining the
"The law requires of the majority stockholders the utmost
good faith in their control and management of the corporation as
regards the minority, and in this respect, such majority stands in
much the same relation8 toward the minority that the directors sustain to a stockholder."'
42

Lindley: "Companies," p. 53o.

"Bradley v. Farwell, i Holmes 433 (U. S. C. C. 1874): "Title to the
property is in the corporation, but their power of management, disposition
and sale is a trust power and the same principle applies to the execution of
trust power as to the dealing with trust estates." Also, Hyams v. Calumet &

Hecla Mining Co., 22r Fed. 529 (915).
"American Ball Bearing Co. v. Adams,

222

Fed. 967 (xgxS).

"Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., x44 Fed. 765 (x9o6).

" Brewer v. Boston Theatre, io4 Mass. 378 (187o).

"15O

N.

Y.

410 (1896).
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duties of the majority to the minority, the trend of modem authority is to insist on the existence of a fiduciary relation Involving the duties of express trusteeship. 48 With such a wealth
of analogy, it is natural that the law, to meet modern business
requirements, should seize upon the trusteeship theory to avoid
the manifest injustice of the gratuitous mandatory conception
of Spering's Appeal. It has been my purpose, in this article, to
survey briefly the many conflicting views of directorate liability,
in the hope that, out of the chaos, we may find some reasonable
standard of liability capable of uniform application. It is submitted that the rule of due care, referred to in Hun v. 'Iry.
supra, should be applied to all directorate action and should be
the measure of directorate liability whether the act complained
of is intra vires or ultra sires, whether affirmative action, or the
reckless and absurd exercise of judgment.
What would be the decision of the present Pennsylvania Supreme Court, were the facts of Spering's Appeal once again
before it, is a matter of conjecture. In view of the recent opinions in that state unequivocally subscribing to the rule of due
care of Hun v. Cary, it is submitted that counsel would be assuming a delicate responsibility in advising a prospective director
that he is liable for gross negligence only and not liable for the
consequences of his reckless and absurd mistakes of judgmenti
if acting in good faith. Spering's Appeal may be used as a
defensive move after the wreck has occurred, but is not a reliable
compass by which to steer.
C. Brewster Rhoads.
Philadelphia,Pa.
"Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 6t6 (1874) ; Menier v. Hoopers Telegraph
Works, g Ch. Ap. Cas. 350 (1874), excellent statement; Ervin v. Oregon Ry.
Co., 20 Fed. 577 (1884) ; Gamble v. R. C. W. Co., 123 N. Y. 91 (i8go) ; Hinds
v. Fishkill Gas Co., 88 N. Y. S. 954 (1904); Sidell v. Missouri, etc., R. R.
Co., 78 Fed. 724 (897); Wright v. Oroville Mining Co., 40 Cal. 20 (1870);
Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. 48 (C. C.) (883); Oliver v. Co, 64
N. J. Eq. 596 (9o3); Booth v. Co, 68 N. J. Eq. 36 (1905); Schmid v.
Lancaster Ave. Theatre, 24 Pa. $t.373 (1914) ; Stebbins v. Michigan Wheelbarrow Co., 212 Fed. 19 (914)

; Provident Trust Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423

(I91
5 ) ; Jones v. Mo. Electric Co., 144 Fed. 7'65 (i9o6). As to salaries see

Althouse v. Cobaugh Co., 227 Pa. 580 (1910).

